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Abstract 
In this paper, we introduce an integrated supply chain risk management process that is grounded in the 
theoretical framework of Bayesian Belief Networks capturing interdependency between risks and risk 
mitigation strategies, and integrating all stages of the risk management process. The proposed process is 
unique in four different ways: instead of mapping the supply network, it makes use of Failure Modes 
and Effects Analysis to model the risk network which is feasible for modelling global supply chains; it is 
driven by new dependency based risk measures that can effectively capture the network wide impact of 
risks for prioritisation; it utilises the concept of Shapley value from the field of cooperative game theory 
to determine a fair allocation of resources to the critical risks identified; and the process helps in 
prioritising potential risk mitigation strategies (both preventive and reactive) subject to budget and 
resource constraints. We demonstrate its application through a simulation study.  
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1. Introduction 
Supply chains have become more complex due to the globalisation and outsourcing in manufacturing 
industries. Global sourcing and lean operations are the main drivers of supply chain disruptions (Son & 
Orchard, 2013). In addition to the network configuration based complexity, non-linear interactions 
between complex chains of risks categorisĞĚĂƐ ‘ƐǇƐƚĞŵŝĐŝƚǇ ?ŽĨƌŝƐŬƐ(Ackermann, Howick, Quigley, 
Walls, & Houghton, 2014) make it a daunting task to understand and manage these dynamics. Supply 
chain risk management (SCRM) is an active area of research that deals with the overall management of 
risks ranging across the entire spectrum of the supply chain including external risk factors. Besides an 
increase in the frequency of disruptions, supply chains are more susceptible because of the increasing 
interdependency between supply chain actors and substantial impact of cascading events. 
Supply chain risks can be viewed with respect to three broad perspectives: Ă ‘ďƵƚƚĞƌĨůǇ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƚŚĂƚ
segregates the causes, risk events and the ultimate impact; the categorisation of risks with respect to 
the resulting impact in terms of delays and disruptions; and the network based classification in terms of 
local-and-global causes and local-and-global effects (Sodhi & Tang, 2012). According to Manuj and 
Mentzer (2008b, p. 205),  “'ůŽďĂů^ZDŝƐƚŚĞŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƌisks and consequent 
losses in the global supply chain, and implementation of appropriate strategies through a coordinated 
approach among supply chain members with the objective of reducing one or more of the following  ? 
losses, probability, speed of event, speed of losses, the time for detection of the events, frequency, or 
exposure  ? for supply chain outcomes that in turn lead to close matching of actual cost savings and 
ƉƌŽĨŝƚĂďŝůŝƚǇǁŝƚŚƚŚŽƐĞĚĞƐŝƌĞĚ ?. 
Risk management comprises different stages including risk identification, risk analysis, risk evaluation, 
risk treatment and risk monitoring (SA, 2009). A number of risk management frameworks have been 
proposed for managing supply chain risks (Chopra & Sodhi, 2004; Knemeyer, Zinn, & Eroglu, 2009; 
Manuj & Mentzer, 2008a; Sinha, Whitman, & Malzahn, 2004; Trkman & McCormack, 2009; Tummala & 
Schoenherr, 2011), however, there are two main limitations about these studies. The first and most 
significant limitation of these frameworks is their consideration of risks as independent factors. 
Classification of risks has been explored comprehensively resulting in identification of independent 
categories of risks for aiding the risk identification stage of SCRM process (Bogataj & Bogataj, 2007; 
Chopra & Sodhi, 2004; Jüttner, Peck, & Christopher, 2003; Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005; Manuj & Mentzer, 
2008a; Oke & Gopalakrishnan, 2009; Tang & Tomlin, 2008). However, risk identification must involve 
different stakeholders and capture the interdependent interaction between risks across different 
domains of the stakeholders (Ackermann et al., 2014; Badurdeen et al., 2014). Studies focussing on 
interdependency between risks generally follow the process flow of the supply chain (Garvey, 
Carnovale, & Yeniyurt, 2015; Leerojanaprapa, van der Meer, & Walls, 2013) which is not feasible when 
considering substantial supply chain networks. 
The second limitation of the analysed frameworks relates to their main focus on the risk identification 
and risk analysis stages whereas risk treatment has not been explored in detail (Colicchia & Strozzi, 
2012). Furthermore, limited studies have assessed risks within an interdependent setting and to the 
ďĞƐƚŽĨƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌƐ ?ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ?ŽŶůǇ Garvey et al. (2015) have introduced probabilistic risk measures for 
interdependent supply chain risks and there is no study that explores interdependency between risks 
and risk mitigation strategies within a probabilistic network setting. These gaps that are found in the 
literature have led to the main research question that drives this research which is: How can we design a 
SCRM process capturing systemic interactions between risks and mitigation strategies across the 
integrated stages of risk identification, risk analysis, risk evaluation and risk treatment; and 
subsequently, how can the potential mitigation strategies be evaluated within the network of 
interdependent risks and strategies in relation to different resource and budget constraints? This 
research paper is a first step towards bridging this significant research gap. It attempts to propose risk 
measures and a process that can help researchers and practitioners appreciate the importance of 
capturing interdependency between risks and strategies across different stages of risk management 
process and develop better models for managing supply chain risks.  
We achieve this by introducing a method of managing supply chain risks within a network setting of 
interacting risks, risk sources and mitigation strategies that is grounded in the theoretical framework of 
Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs). For risk identification, we utilise the key feature of Failure Modes and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA) in identifying supply chain risks, associated sources and potential mitigation 
strategies. For risk assessment, we introduce dependency based probabilistic risk measures for 
identifying the relative importance of each risk within the network of interacting risks. For risk 
treatment, we consider two scenarios: if the strategies and associated cost are not explicitly evaluated, 
we make use of Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) from the field of cooperative game theory in order to 
address the problem of allocating a fair amount of the budget to the critical risks identified through the 
measures; if the strategies with associated cost are already identified within the network, we focus on 
optimising strategies in relation to resource and budget constraints. We demonstrate the use of 
proposed process through a simulation study that is based on the case study of Tuncel and Alpan (2010).   
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: An overview of FMEA and BBNs is presented in 
section 2. Section 3 provides a brief review of the relevant literature. The proposed risk measures, 
propositions and the Shapley value based method are described in section 4. The proposed process is 
presented in section 5. The application of the proposed process is demonstrated through a simulation 
study in section 6. Finally, we conclude our paper with important findings and present future research 
themes in section 7. 
2.  FMEA and BBNs 
2.1 FMEA 
FMEA or Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) is a systematic approach of identifying 
different modes of failure and evaluating associated risks during the development stage of a product or 
service. It is known to have been implemented in 1963 for projects at NASA and later, the Ford Motor 
Company utilised the technique in 1977 (Gilchrist, 1993). The typical process involves: identification of 
failure modes, associated causes and resulting consequences; assigning the values of occurrence (O), 
severity (S) and detection (D) to each failure mode on an ordinal scale of 1-10 for each linguistic 
variable; calculating the Risk Priority Number (RPN) of each failure mode which is the product of three 
numbers identified previously; ranking the failure modes and planning actions on high ranking modes; 
and finally reviewing the effectiveness of implemented actions and revising the risk measures. 
There are some major shortcomings of using RPN as a measure of prioritising risks (Gilchrist, 1993; 
Nepal & Yadav, 2015). The elicited value relative to each ordinal scale is quite subjective and 
furthermore, a risk having a high value of severity (O=6, S=10, D=6) might still score lower (RPN=360) in 
comparison with a risk (O=6, S=8, D=8) that might be less critical (RPN=384). Therefore, the calculation 
of RPN as a product of three numbers does not justify the rationale. In this study, we propose using the 
features of FMEA in identifying important risks and associated risk sources but instead of using the 
ordinal scales for occurrence and severity, we utilise the values of probability and losses resulting from 
realisation of risks. We also establish interdependency between identified risks and risk sources that 
helps in overcoming the notion of independent risks inherent in the conventional scheme of FMEA.  
 
2.2 BBNs 
BBNs are a framework for modelling uncertainty. BBNs have their background in statistics and artificial 
intelligence and were first introduced in the 1980s for dealing with uncertainty in knowledge-based 
systems (Sigurdsson, Walls, & Quigley, 2001). They have been successfully used in addressing problems 
related to a number of diverse specialties including reliability modelling, medical diagnosis, geographical 
information systems, and aviation safety management. For understanding the mechanics and modelling 
of BBNs, interested readers may consult Jensen and Nielsen (2007), and Kjaerulff and Anders (2008). We 
consider BBNs as the best choice of modelling technique in our situation as it facilitates capturing 
interdependency between risks and strategies. 
There are a number of benefits associated with BBNs: firstly, these provide a graphical representation of 
the problem that can help stakeholders visualise the interaction between a number of variables; 
probabilistic reasoning is easily captured and propagated through powerful software and prior beliefs 
about the uncertain variables can be easily updated after providing evidence against separate sources in 
the network; uncertainty in reasoning is taken into account and the (in)dependence between variables 
can be recognised; and one can model BBNs even when there is limited empirical data. However, there 
are some shortcomings of the method as well: elicitation of expert judgment in both developing and 
populating the network is challenging when data is not readily available; available software have limited 
capability in dealing with continuous variables as the variables have to be discretised which can lead to a 
limited ability to capture the original distribution of the variable; and the  ?ĂĐǇĐůŝĐŐƌĂƉŚ ?requirement, 
which is needed to carry out probability calculus, is another limitation that results in feedback effects 
not being included in the network (Jensen & Nielsen, 2007). 
3. Literature Review: Models for Managing Interdependent Supply Chain Risks 
As the research question investigates development of a SCRM process considering interdependency 
between supply chain risks and mitigation strategies, the focus will be limited to the literature dealing 
with interdependent risks. For a comprehensive overview of quantitative models in SCRM, interested 
readers may consult the literature review conducted by Fahimnia, Tang, Davarzani, and Sarkis (2015). A 
number of models have been proposed for identifying and assessing supply chain risks, however, limited 
studies have considered interdependency between risks. Cause-effect diagram (Lin & Zhou, 2011) and 
social network theory (Kim, Choi, Yan, & Dooley, 2011) have been used for mapping causal interaction 
between supply chain risks. Interpretive structural modelling has been used for modelling 
interdependency between risks (Pfohl, Gallus, & Thomas, 2011) and identifying the interdependent 
enablers of risk mitigation (Faisal, Banwet, & Shankar, 2006) which helps in not only mapping the 
relationship between variables but also in developing a hierarchy of the network. The main problem 
with these techniques is the inability of modelling the strength of relationship between interconnected 
risks. 
FMEA has been used for identifying and assessing supply chain risks (Nepal & Yadav, 2015; Tuncel & 
Alpan, 2010). The major shortcoming of these studies is the use of RPN for ranking risks (Gilchrist, 1993) 
and failure to capture the network wide propagation of risks. Supplier selection/assessment has 
remained one of the active areas of research and a number of methods including Analytical Hierarchy 
Process (AHP) (Chen & Wu, 2013) and BBNs (Dogan & Aydin, 2011) have been developed to assess 
supplier related risks. The main limitation of these studies is their focus on addressing a specific problem 
without considering the holistic interaction of risks across the supply network (Garvey et al., 2015).  
The likelihood of the occurrence of an (undesirable) event, and the negative implications of the event 
are two common measures of risk (Bogataj & Bogataj, 2007). Risk mitigation strategies are implemented 
in order to reduce the likelihood of occurrence and/or negative impact of risks (Tang & Tomlin, 2008). 
Robust strategies must be developed in order to help firms reduce cost and/or improve customer 
satisfaction under normal conditions and enable firms to sustain operations during and after the 
disruption. A number of studies have proposed selecting strategies specific to the supply chain 
configuration and risks (Christopher & Lee, 2004; Christopher, Mena, Khan, & Yurt, 2011; Son & 
Orchard, 2013; Speier, Whipple, Closs, & Voss, 2011; Zsidisin, Ellram, Carter, & Cavinato, 2004). Few 
studies (Aqlan & Lam, 2015; Micheli, Mogre, & Perego, 2014) have considered the optimisation problem 
of selecting cost-effective risk mitigation strategies, however, no study has ever considered the problem 
of evaluating optimal combinations of risk mitigation strategies within a probabilistic network setting of 
interacting risks and strategies. 
BBNs have been extensively applied to the field of risk management (Ashrafi, Davoudpour, & 
Khodakarami, 2015; Norrington, Quigley, Russell, & Van der Meer, 2008; Wu, Yang, Chang, Château, & 
Chang, 2015) mainly because BBNs offer a unique feature of modelling risks combining both the 
statistical data and subjective judgment in case of non-availability of data (Dogan & Aydin, 2011). 
However, their application to the field of SCRM in modelling holistic interaction between risks has 
recently gained the interest of researchers (Garvey et al., 2015; Leerojanaprapa et al., 2013). Badurdeen 
et al. (2014) introduced a supply chain risk taxonomy and a risk network map capturing 
interdependency between risks. Their model presents an effective tool to capture the interaction of risk 
factors and helps in identifying critical suppliers.  
In a recent study conducted by Garvey et al. (2015), supply chain process and risks corresponding to 
various segments of the supply network are combined together and modelled as a BBN. They also 
introduce new risk measures for identification of important elements within the supply network. Their 
proposed modelling framework  differs from the existing BBN based studies in SCRM (Badurdeen et al., 
2014; Dogan & Aydin, 2011; Lockamy, 2014) in terms of exploring the propagation impact of risks across 
the network of interconnected risks and supply network elements, but their proposed risk measures 
only consider the impact of risks on the descendant nodes and ignore capturing the diagnostic effect. 
They also incorporate the loss values within their modelling framework thereby overcoming the major 
limitation of earlier studies in terms of focusing on only the probabilistic interdependency between 
risks. However, the proposed framework does not focus on modelling and evaluating risk mitigation 
strategies (risk treatment). Furthermore, it might not be feasible to adopt the method for mapping a 
huge network as the method necessitates following the process flow of the supply chain.   
Heckmann, Comes, and Nickel (2015) conducted a critical review of quantitative approaches for 
managing supply chain risks focussing on the definitions, measures and modelling of risk. According to 
them:  ‘^ƚĂŶĚĂƌĚĚĞǀŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŵĞĂŶ-variance approaches, value-at-risk, conditional-value-at-risk or 
premiums are risk measures that aim at describing the interaction of uncertainty and the extent of its 
related harm or benefit. Owing to the lack of quantitative measures that capture the more complex 
realities of supply chains, these measures  ? developed in finance and insurance contexts  ? are applied for 
ƐƵƉƉůǇĐŚĂŝŶƌŝƐŬ ?ƚŽŽ ? (Heckmann et al., 2015, p. 127). However, a closer look at the cited references in 
their study reveals that the measures are not developed for interdependent risks and that is why the 
risk measures introduced by Garvey et al. (2015) are deemed as state-of-the-art in terms of capturing 
the inƚĞƌĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐǇďĞƚǁĞĞŶƌŝƐŬƐĂŶĚ ‘measuring monetary losses within supply chain management ? 
(Heckmann et al., 2015, p. 128). However, Garvey et al. (2015) rightly identify the limitation of their 
proposed measures as these only capture propagation of losses across the pure descendants of risks 
(causal effect) rather than evaluating the network wide propagation of losses (causal and diagnostic 
effects).  
Although our study can be considered as an extension to the study conducted by Garvey et al. (2015) in 
terms of exploring BBNs as a framework for managing supply chain risks, there are some major 
differences. Our contribution to the literature in SCRM is multi-faceted: we introduce a comprehensive 
integrated process of SCRM grounded in the theoretical framework of BBNs and to the best of the 
ĂƵƚŚŽƌƐ ?ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ?ĂƉƌŽďĂďŝůŝƐƚŝĐŐƌĂƉŚŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŶŐĂůůƐƚĂŐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞƌŝƐŬŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĂŶĚ
capturing interdependency between risks and strategies has never been explored; we propose 
dependency based probabilistic risk measures capturing network wide impact of risks that help in 
prioritising risks both in the risk assessment and risk monitoring stages; we utilise the concept of 
Shapley value to determine fair allocation of resources to the critical risks identified; and we establish a 
method of prioritising risk mitigation strategies within a probabilistic network setting.  
4. Metrics to Support Resource Allocation and Their Characteristics 
In this section we start in 4.1 with a simple illustrative example to motivate the measures we propose 
for assessing risk on the network. In section 4.2 we explore characteristics of these measures and reflect 
on their applicability in defining appropriate risk mitigation strategies for a network. In section 4.3 we 
explore characteristics of an optimal portfolio of risks subject to a budget constraint. Lastly in section 4.4 
we consider the use of Shapley value on the network to identify fair budget allocations prior to 
developing risk mitigation strategies.   
4.1 Motivating Example 
Consider a supply network with three identified risks and an associated BBN illustrated in Fig. 1. Risk 1 
(R1) and Risk 3 (R3) have no parent nodes with a probability of being realised of 0.5 and 0.2, 
respectively. Risk 2 (R2) is dependent on both R1 and R3 with Conditional Probability Table (CPT) 
provided in Table 1, and a marginal probability of being realised of 0.429. Associated with R1, R2 and R3 
are a Loss 1, 2 and 3 of 100, 1000 and 500 respectively if the risk is realised. This produces a correlation 
between Loss 1 and Loss 2 of 0.34 and Loss 2 and Loss 3 of 0.53. 
 
Fig. 1. A Bayesian Belief Network illustrating three risks each with an associated loss node and a total 
loss node (GeNIe, 2015) 
Table 1. Conditional probability table of Risk 2 
  State of Risk 1 
  Not Realised (0.5) Realised (0.5) 
  State of Risk 3 State of Risk 3 
  Not Realised (0.8) Realised (0.2) Not Realised (0.8) Realised (0.2) 
State of 
Risk 2 
Realised 0.1 0.9 0.5 0.99 
Not Realised 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.01 
 
The expected direct loss from R1, R2 and R3 is 50, 429 and 100 respectively with an Expected Total Loss 
of 579 and a standard deviation of 638. We shall refer to the Expected Total Loss as the Risk Network 
Expected Loss (ܴܰܧܮ) to reflect that the loss represents a total loss across the network of risks after 
accounting for the propagation of risks through the network. Illustrated in Fig. 2 is the probability 
distribution for the realised Total Loss, so while the mean of this distribution is 579, the probability of 
realising a total loss in excess of this is 0.43, of realising a loss of at least twice the mean is 0.389 and 
there is a probability of 0.099 that the total loss will be 1600, almost three times the mean.   
Decision makers may have resources available to wholly or partially mitigate a risk, in which case 
assessing the impact a risk has on Network Loss becomes important. This is a challenging exercise in the 
presence of dependency or correlation between the direct losses, as once realised a risk can propagate 
consequences, increasing the likelihood of realising other risks. Fig. 3 illustrates three probability 
functions representing the distribution with R1, R2 or R3 entirely mitigated (i.e. the probability of it 
being realised is set to zero). Key summary statistics of these distributions are provided in Table 2. The 
distributions are quite different which is not reflected in measures such as ܴܰܧܮ. No distribution 
stochastically dominates, so choosing the most important risk to manage will depend on the 
preferences of the decision maker: how mitigating each risk is valued by the decision maker depends on 
their assessment of the value of the change in the probability distribution that materialises.   
 
Fig. 2. Probability distribution of Network Loss 
 
Fig. 3. Probability distribution of Network Loss assuming Risk 1, Risk 2 or Risk 3 is removed showing a 
variety of shapes 
Table 2. Summary Statistics from the distribution of Network Loss assuming Risk 1, Risk 2 or Risk 3 is 
removed 
Risk Removed RNEL Standard Deviation 
Best Case 
(probability) 
Worst Case 
(probability) 
None 579 638 0 (0.36) 1600 (0.099) 
Risk 1 360 600 0 (0.72) 1500 (0.18) 
Risk 2 150 206 0 (0.45) 600 (0.10) 
Risk 3 350 482 0 (0.40) 1100 (0.25) 
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Consider the conditional distributions of Network Loss given a risk has been realised (i.e. its probability 
is set to one). For the simple illustrative example in this section the three conditional distributions are 
provided in Fig. 4. Note that, due to the direction of the causal relationship between R1 and R3, and R2, 
if R2 is realised the probability of R1 and R3 are not updated as there is no change in epistemic 
uncertainty. It is clear from this illustration that the influence of each risk on possible network losses is 
very different: for example, the expected loss if R3 is realised is much higher than if R2 is realised.  
Whilst ܴܰܧܮ gives an ex ante measure of losses that are at stake on the network, it does not allow any 
inference about the importance of individual risks. In order to do this we propose the Risk Network 
Expected Loss Propagation Measure for Risk ݅ (ܴܰܧܮܲܯ௜), which measures the probability-weighted ܴܰܧܮ if risk ݅ is realised. Table 3 provides a summary of the distributions illustrated in Fig. 4 along with 
the ܴܰܧܮܲܯ for each risk. 
 
Fig. 4. Probability distribution of Network Loss given Risk 1, Risk 2 or Risk 3 is realised 
Table 3. Summary Measures of Network Loss given risks realised 
Risk Realised 
RNEL given risk 
realised 
Probability of 
realising risk 
RNELPM 
Difference between RNEL given 
risk realised and RNEL 
UTC 
Risk 1 798 0.50 399 219 110 
Risk 2 1150 0.43 495 571 246 
Risk 3 1498 0.20 300 919 184 
 
The idea of proposing the ܴܰܧܮܲܯ is to allow decision makers to prioritise the reduction of risk on the 
network if resources are available to do so by identifying those risks that have the greatest effect on the 
network expected loss given the propagation of risks through the network, also accounting for the 
likelihood of them occurring. This takes the mean of the distribution for each risk in Fig. 4 and weights it 
by the probability of the risk occurring. If decision makers are risk-neutral their assessment of the 
distribution is correctly summarised by the average. If a decision maker has non-neutral risk 
preferences, it would not be appropriate to use the expected loss to summarise the distribution, but to 
consider the expected utility of the loss: a probability-weighted average of the utility of the losses that 
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might be realised if a risk is realised, which should then itself be weighted by the probability of the loss 
occurring. Eliciting a decision ŵĂŬĞƌ ?ƐƵƚŝůŝƚǇĨƵŶĐƚion is known to be challenging (Ruan, Yin, & Frangopol, 
2015) leading to difficulties in operationalising such a measure and so, whilst it may be interesting to 
pursue this in future work, we turn our attention to a different line of inquiry. 
There is lots of evidence to suggest that human decision makers evaluate the outcomes from the 
ĐŚŽŝĐĞƐƚŚĞǇŵĂŬĞďǇĐŽŵƉĂƌŝŶŐƚŚŽƐĞŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƚŽĂƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŽƵƚĐŽŵĞ ?ĂŶĚĞǆŚŝďŝƚŝŶŐ ‘ůŽƐƐ
ĂǀĞƌƐŝŽŶ ? ?dŚŝƐŝƐƚŚĞĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƚŚĂƚŝĨĂŶŽƵƚĐŽŵĞŝƐĂĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĂŵŽƵŶƚǁŽƌƐĞƚŚĂŶƚŚĞƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ
outcome then this gives a greater reduction in the attractiveness of the outcome than the increase in 
attractiveness if an outcome is the same amount better than the reference outcome. The idea of loss 
aversion was made famous by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in their  ‘WƌŽƐƉĞĐƚƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŚĂƐďĞĞŶ
developed in particular by <ƅƐǌĞŐŝĂŶĚZĂďŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?, who carefully consider the use of expectations as 
reference points, and applied extensively to many interesting scenarios. 
In the context of a network of interdependent supply chain risks, it is far from inconceivable that a 
supply chain manager may have in mind an expected loss for the standard configuration of the network, 
and in evaluating the importance of particular risks may place more emphasis on those risks that 
increase the network expected loss above the expected loss for the standard configuration, which is 
ƚĂŬĞŶĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞůŽƐƐ ?. While managers may have differing degrees of loss aversion, a 
straightforward way to capture this is to evaluate the impact of a risk being realised by focussing only on 
where realisation of that risk leads to losses that exceed the reference loss, and ignore instances where 
the loss falls below the reference loss. In the case of our simple example, we can easily evaluate the 
Expected Loss in Excess of the Mean (ܧܮܧܯ), i.e. ܧሾሺܰ݁ݐݓ݋ݎ݇ܮ݋ݏݏ െ ܴܰܧܮǡ  ?ሻሿ, using the 
distribution in Fig. 2 to obtain 305. However, for more complex networks this measure becomes 
computationally burdensome, and as an approximation we consider that the decision maker is 
concerned with the maximum of the difference between the ܴܰܧܮ if the risk is realised and the 
reference loss, and ǌĞƌŽ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĞĚĞĨŝŶĞĂƐƚŚĞ ‘hƉƉĞƌdĂŝůŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ? ?ܷܶܥ) of a risk. By isolating 
expected losses in excess of the reference loss, this measure provides an alternative assessment of risk 
that captures the importance of reference dependence and loss aversion in the evaluation of risks. The 
calculations for these measures are given in Table 3. 
While ܴܰܧܮܲܯ and ܷܶܥ are similar in emphasis of purpose, upon comparing the summary measures 
in Table 3 we see that ܴܰܧܮܲܯ provides a different rank to the risks than ܷܶܥ. Overall, R2 comes out 
as being high in importance, but using ܴܰܧܮ R1 and R3 are marginally different, ܴܰܧܮܲܯ has R1 being 
more important than R3, and the opposite is true withܷܶܥ. In the following section we will formally 
define these measures and explore their characteristics. 
 
 
4.2 The Risk Measures and Their Properties 
In this section we will be concerned with elucidating the properties of the three measures introduced in 
section 4.1. These are the ܴܰܧܮ (1), which is the expected total loss on the network, the ܷܶܥ௜  (2), 
which is the expected increase in ܴܰܧܮ from realising risk ݅ and ܴܰܧܮܲܯ௜  (3), which is the expected 
network loss from realising risk݅. Our intention is to investigate the applicability of these measures 
within an optimisation algorithm to determine the cost optimal level to target the probability of each 
risk. All proofs are contained in the Supplementary Material (see Appendix A).  
 ܴܰܧܮ ൌ ܧሾܰܮሿ (1) 
 ܷܶܥ௜ ൌ ܧோ೔ሾ݉ܽݔሺܧሾܰܮȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿ െ ܧሾܰܮሿǡ  ?ሻሿ (2) 
 ܴܰܧܮܲܯ௜ ൌ ܧሾܰܮȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿܲሺܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሻ (3) 
We start with making observation 1, where using ܴܰܧܮ as a reference point, realising a risk will occur 
increases the updated ܴܰܧܮ and realising a risk will not occur decreases the updated ܴܰܧܮ for all risks. 
Observation 1: ܧሾܰܮȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿ ൑ ܴܰܧܮ ൑ ܧሾܰܮȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿ 
Observation 2 establishes that ܷܶܥ௜ will never exceed the Expected Loss in Excess of the Mean (ܧܮܧܯ). 
Observation 2: ܧܮܧܯ ൒ ܷܶܥ௜ 
Observation 3 establishes the relationship between the three measures for a specific risk on the 
network, and the expected loss on the network. As such a risk with a higher probability of being realised 
as a loss has a greater difference between ܴܰܧܮܲܯ௜and ܷܶܥ௜. 
Observation 3: 
ܴܰܧܮܲܯ݅െܷܶܥ݅௉ሺܴ݅ൌ ?ሻ ൌ ܴܰܧܮ , ׊݅ 
This leads to the first proposition concerning ܷܶܥ௜, which shows the relationship between ܷܶܥ௜ and ܧܮܧܯ with respect to the probability of experiencing a network loss below ܴܰܧܮ. The second 
proposition is motivated by focussing on the network losses that are in excess of a reference point, 
namely the ܴܰܧܮ. We can define the Lower Tail Gain for risk ݅, to be the expected gain from realising 
network losses below the reference point. The equivalence of these measures is expressed in 
Proposition 2.   
Proposition 1: As the conditional probability of realising an aggregate network loss below the ܴܰܧܮ  
given risk ݅ has been realised, i.e. ܲሺܰ݁ݐݓ݋ݎ݇ܮ݋ݏݏ ൏ ܴܰܧܮȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሻ,decreases ܷܶܥ௜ approaches ܧܮܧܯ, i.e. ݈݅݉௉ሺே௘௧௪௢௥௞௅௢௦௦ழோோ௅ȁோ೔ୀଵሻ՜଴ ܷܶܥ݅ ൌ ܧܮܧܯ.    
Proposition 2:  The Upper Tail Contribution for risk ݅ (ܷܶܥ௜) equals the Lower Tail Gain for risk ݅ (ܮܶܩ௜), 
i.e. ܷܶܥ௜ ൌ ܧோ೔ሾ݉ܽݔሺܧሾܰܮሿ െ ܧሾܰܮȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿǡ  ?ሻሿ. 
The third proposition explicates the relationship between ܷܶܥ௜ and the variance of its associated risk 
denoted by ߪ௜ଶ. 
Proposition 3: ܷܶܥ௜ is proportional to the variance of the indicator variable for the risk, specifically ܷܶܥ௜ ൌ ߪ௜ଶሾܧሾܰܮȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿ െ ܧሾܰܮȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿሿ. 
4.3 Optimal Control of Risk 
We now consider that a supply chain manager has been allocated a budget that can be used to reduce 
risk on the network, and consider the optimal way in which to reduce risk. We suppose that risks are 
controllable, in the sense that the manager can undertake costly actions to reduce the probability that a 
risk is realised, or indeed perhaps release some cost by allowing the probability of a risk being realised 
to increase. For ease of notation, let ௜ܲ ൌ ܲሺܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሻ and define ܥ௜ሺ ௜ܲሻ as the cost of achieving ௜ܲ. Since 
we are considering optimising from the standard configuration, we define the cost in the standard 
configuration as zero for each risk, and further suppose that for each ݅ ܥ௜ሺǤ ሻ is continuously 
differentiable as many times as required and strictly decreasing in its argument (i.e. ܥ௜ᇱሺǤ ሻ ൏  ?), meaning 
it is costly to reduce the probability of a risk being realised. We further suppose that the cost function is 
convex (i.e. ܥ௜ᇱᇱሺǤ ሻ ൐  ?), implying that the incremental cost of further reductions in the probability of a 
risk being realised is higher the smaller the probability is. A risk mitigation problem will involve 
ŵŝŶŝŵŝƐŝŶŐĂƌŝƐŬŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐƵďũĞĐƚƚŽƚŚĞƚŽƚĂůĐŽƐƚŽĨƌŝƐŬŵŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŶŽƚĞǆĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĂŶĂŐĞƌ ?Ɛ
budget constraint, that we denote ܿ଴. 
While ܷܶܥ is a risk measure that captures reference dependence and loss aversion in decision making, 
an unfortunate consequence of Proposition 2 is that it does not make an effective decision making tool; 
as we show in the following corollary it can lead to very poor decisions being made. 
Corollary 1: If ܥ௜ሺ ௜ܲሻ is decreasing in ௜ܲ, optimising a portfolio of risks with the objective of ݉݅݊  ? ܷܶܥ݅݅  
with respect to ௜ܲ  will lead to maximising ܧሾܰܮሿ. 
Instead, we turn to consider ܴܰܧܮܲܯ݅ as a risk measure to guide the management of risks on an 
interdependent supply network. In Proposition 4 we characterise the relationship between the optimal 
level to target probabilities of risks being realised in relation to ܧሾܰܮȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿ. 
Proposition 4: Optimising a portfolio of risks with the objective of ݉݅݊  ? ܴܰܧܮܲܯ݅݅  with respect to ௜ܲ  
subject to a budget constraint results in an optimal ௜ܲ  such that marginal cost at ௜ܲ  is proportional to ܧሾܰܮȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿ for all ݅.  
The optimal risk mitigation strategy calls for the marginal benefit of incrementally reducing a risk being 
realised to be weighed up against the marginal cost of further reductions in the probability, accounting 
for the fact that the budget is constrained. When optimising from a standard configuration with a fresh 
budget a manager may optimally reduce or increase certain risks. The solution to the optimisation 
problem allows us to consider optimal risk realisation probabilities as a function of the budget, and 
inspection of this relationship reveals that under our assumptions a relaxation of the budget constraint 
will result in the probability of all risks materialising being reduced. As such, while the further reduction 
of certain risks might be favoured over others, no risk will see an increase in the probability of it 
materialising. This is formalised in Proposition 5. Lemma 1, which is used in the proof of this proposition, 
characterises the relationship between the marginal benefit of increasing the budget, denoted by ߣכ, 
and the budget, denoted by ܿ଴, with the curvature of the cost function.   
Lemma 1: Assuming ܥ௜ᇱሺ ௜ܲሻ ൏  ? and ݏ݅݃݊൫ܥ௜ᇱᇱሺ ௜ܲሻ൯ ൌ ݏ݅݃݊ ቀܥ௝ᇱᇱ൫ ௝ܲ൯ቁ׊݅ǡ ݆ then 
ݏ݅݃݊ ቆ݀ߣכ݀ܿ଴ቇ ൌ െݏ݅݃݊൫ܥ௜ᇱᇱሺ ௜ܲሻ൯ 
Proposition 5: If the cost function of changing the probability of each risk being realised is convex, then 
increasing the budget,ܿ଴, for risk mitigation will not result in decreased optimal probability for any 
risk, ௜ܲכሺܿ଴ሻ . Specifically, ݀ ௜ܲכሺܿ଴ሻ݀ܿ଴ ൌ  ?ܥ௜ᇱ ൅ ܥ௜ᇱᇱܥ௜ᇱ  ? ܥԢ݆  ?ܥ௝ᇱᇱ௝ஷ௜ ൏  ?ǡ ׊݅ 
In section 6 we will investigate an illustrative case on a much larger network than the one explored in 
section 4.1. We will determine the optimal risk mitigation strategy, which is in fact, identifying the 
optimal target levels to reduce the risks to subject to budget constraints. Such decision making requires 
that we can express costs as a function of these probabilities. Such a model requires the risk mitigation 
strategies to be quite advanced in their planning. Prior to this, we do require budgets to be allocated to 
risks about which we can plan such activities. Tackling this decision problem is addressed in section 4.4. 
4.4 Shapley Value 
We make use of Shapley value to determine the relative contribution of controlling each risk to the 
overall reduction in the risk network expected loss. The Shapley value, having its roots in cooperative 
game theory, has been applied to various problems including environmental pollution cost allocation, 
production decisions, transportation, allocation of electricity transmission costs and insurance pricing 
(Quigley & Walls, 2007). It has also been applied for trading reliability targets between supply chain 
partners in an aerospace industry (Quigley & Walls, 2007). Shapley derived a formula for evaluating the 
contribution of a player to the value of a cartel in a cooperative game (Shapley, 1953).  
We adapt the cooperative game theory setting to our problem of allocating resources to critical risks. 
Individual risks (and associated controls) are the players, cartel is represented by the coalition of risk 
controls applied to the specific risks and value corresponds to the relevant benefit in reducing the risk 
network expected loss. Any risk which is not the member of a network of controlled risks (coalition) is 
considered to be in its current (uncontrolled) state. As the formula for evaluating Shapley value is based 
on three axioms, we adapt these to the setting of SCRM as follows: 
1. The benefit (reduction in risk network expected loss) attributed to the contribution of a risk 
control depends upon whether the risk control is implemented or not, and does not depend on the 
order in which the control was included in the set of risk controls. 
2. The sum of the benefits attributed to the individual risk controls should equal the benefits made 
within the set of risk controls, with controls making no contribution to the set of controls being assigned 
zero value. 
3. There is no expected loss or gain in delaying the implementation of a risk control at any given 
decision point.  
It is assumed that the number of risk controls to be considered is specified a priori and is denoted by ȁܰȁ. Let ܼ represent the set of risk controls that have already been implemented prior to implementing 
the risk control ݅ and ȁܼȁ is the corresponding number of risk controls. The benefit arising from 
implementing the risk control ݅ to a network of size ȁܰȁ is given by the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953): 
 ߔ௜ ൌ ෍ ȁܼȁǨ ሺȁܰȁ െ ȁܼȁ െ  ?ሻǨȁܰȁǨ௓אேି௜ ሾݒሺܼ ׫ ሼ݅ሽሻ െ ݒሺܼሻሿ (4) 
Where ݒሺܼ ׫ ሼ݅ሽሻ represents the benefit (reduction in risk network expected loss) of implementing risk 
controls ܼ and control ݅, ݒሺܼሻ is the benefit of implementing controls ܼ; ȁܼȁ and ȁܰȁ indicate the 
number of elements in the sets ܼ and ܰ respectively. Shapley value is a weighted average of the 
marginal contribution risk control ݅ makes to a coalition, averaged over all possible permutations of 
entry to the coalition. The weights represent the probability of formation of a coalition of size ܼ prior to 
the implementation of risk control ݅. The calculation of Shapley value for the risk network (see Fig. 1) is 
shown in Table 4.  
Table 4. Relative benefit of controlling each risk toward reduction in risk network expected loss  
Control Risks ܼ ׫ ሼ݅ሽ Expected Loss Benefit of Control Marginal Contribution ሾݒሺܼ ׫ ሼ݅ሽሻ െ ݒሺܼሻሿ Weight ȁܼȁǨ ሺȁܰȁ െ ȁܼȁ െ  ?ሻǨȁܰȁǨ  ݅ ൌ ܴ ? ݅ ൌ ܴ ? ݅ ൌ ܴ ? 
0 579 0      ? 360 219 219   1/3  ? 150 429  429  1/3  ? 350 229   229 1/3  ?ǡ  ? 100 479 50 260  1/6  ?ǡ  ? 100 479 250  260 1/6  ?ǡ  ? 50 529  300 100 1/6  ?ǡ  ?ǡ  ? 0 579 50 100 100 1/3 ݄ܵܽ݌݈݁ݕݒ݈ܽݑ݁ߔ௜ 139.67  269.66  169.67  ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁݅݉݌݋ݎݐܽ݊ܿ݁ (%) 24.1 46.6 29.3  
 
It is clear from the calculations that controlling R2 will be most beneficial to the network whereas 
controlling R1 or R3 is relatively less important. These values help in evaluating fair allocation of budget 
to the risks. The method captures all possible combinations of risk interactions. Shapley value provides a 
fair allocation of resources for risk mitigation as a starting point. Consider a situation where we have 
two risks (R1, R2) each with probability 1 of causing loss and the total loss is 1 unit regardless of the 
cause, i.e. only one or both. The Shapley value would be 0.5 for each risk but the risk is not reduced by 
50% through eliminating R1 or R2. Therefore, if we have a budget B, then Shapley value suggests an 
initial proposal would be to allocate B/2 to each risk. However, we might be able to mitigate R1 for B/4 
and spend 3B/4 on R2 and this could be an optimal allocation of the budget. So the optimisation aspect 
plays a different role and requires plans to be costed.   
4.5 Summary 
In this section we have proposed and illustrated new measures from assessing the contribution of risks 
to the aggregate loss across the network subject to dependency. The measures we considered in 
sections 4.1 and 4.2 are concerned with explicating the relationship between excess of losses on a 
network above a point of reference such as ܴܰܧܮ and the probabilities associated with these risks. We 
followed this by considering how to initially identify a fair allocation of resources to mitigate risks before 
mitigation strategies have been developed through Shapley value. In section 5 we will formally present 
our integrated process for supply risk management and in section 6 illustrate its application. 
5. Proposed Risk Management Process 
The proposed process comprises three main stages of problem structuring, instantiation and inference 
as shown in Fig. 5. The model can be developed through conducting interviews and focus group sessions 
with the experts. Although we make use of FMEA, the criticism related to the subjective nature of RPN 
(Liu, Liu, & Liu, 2013) is not relevant to our method because the FMEA is just utilised for identifying risks, 
sources and mitigation strategies. As the complete information or data concerning risks is generally not 
available, there is always a need to involve experts in modelling both the qualitative and quantitative 
parts of the model which makes the process quite subjective. However, any method will have to rely on 
expert judgment in case of non-availability of data and as our method is grounded within the framework 
of BBNs, well-established procedures and protocol can be adopted in order to develop and validate the 
model (Nadkarni & Shenoy, 2004; Pitchforth & Mengersen, 2013).  
For better understanding, a block diagram is presented as Fig. 6 which manifests the contribution of this 
study to the established risk management process (SA, 2009). Although we demonstrate the application 
of the model for a one-time decision problem of prioritising risks and mitigation strategies (at time: ࢀ ൌ ࢚૙), it can easily be extended to monitor and re-evaluate risks and strategies periodically. For a 
detailed discussion on each stage of the risk management process, interested readers may consult SA 
(2009).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Modelling flowchart of the proposed process (steps in brackets are applicable to scenario 2 only 
where mitigation strategies and associated cost are already established in the problem structuring) 
The proposed process fits well with two distinct scenarios: in scenario 1, risk mitigation strategies and 
associated cost are not pre-defined; while in scenario 2, the strategies and associated cost are already 
established within the problem structuring stage. In both scenarios, our proposed risk measures help in 
prioritising critical risks for the risk monitoring stage. If the potential risk mitigation strategies are 
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already identified within the network setting with associated cost and efficacy in mitigating risks, we do 
not need to assess risks before implementing strategies as each combination of strategies would have a 
unique impact on the risk network and therefore, it makes sense to re-evaluate risks after selecting 
optimal strategies. Once the strategies are not already defined, we need to identify critical risks using an 
appropriate risk measure and subsequently determine fair allocation of resources to mitigate the critical 
risks using Shapley value. The detailed flow charts for the two scenarios are presented in the 
Supplementary Material (see Appendix B). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Block diagram representing the integration of proposed methodology in the risk management 
process 
5.1 Stages of the Process 
5.1.1 Problem Structuring 
Firstly, supply chain risks (failure modes) and associated risk sources are identified using the FMEA. In 
the case of scenario 2, the objective function is also defined taking into account the budget and/or 
resource constraints. The second step involves identifying interdependency between common risk 
sources and risks using the technique of cognitive mapping besides selecting potential mitigation 
strategies in case of scenario 2. Finally, the network structure is developed through connecting the arcs 
across related risk sources, risks and mitigation strategies (if applicable) and all nodes are expressed as 
statistical variables. The problem owner needs to ensure that the model is developed to represent the 
actual interdependency between risks. The model builder can assist in structuring the model keeping in 
view the mechanics of a BBN as the problem owner might not understand the importance of 
establishing correct relationships between causes and effects. 
5.1.2 Instantiation 
This stage involves evaluation of (conditional) probabilities (including effectiveness of mitigation 
strategies in case of scenario 2) either through elicitation from the experts or extraction from available 
data. Probability elicitation is the most difficult task of the modelling process as experts find it 
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challenging to describe conditional probabilities. Loss values are also elicited for all the risks and the cost 
of each mitigation strategy is ascertained through expert judgment in case of scenario 2.  
5.1.3 Inference 
In the case of scenario 1, key risks are identified through evaluating specific risk measures suitable for 
the purpose: ܴܰܧܮܲܯ is suitable for capturing a risk-neutral appetite; whereas ܷܶܥ is suitable for 
modelling risk-averse attitude where extreme losses are of greater concern. Once critical risks are 
identified, Shapley value is used for assigning resources to mitigate risks as well as comparing if the risk 
mitigation strategies are well priced. In the case of scenario 2, beliefs are updated and propagated 
across the interconnected risks, risk sources and mitigation strategies. For each possible combination of 
strategies, the network wide parameter ܴܰܧܮ is evaluated and cost and benefit analysis of various 
combinations of mitigation strategies is conducted. Depending on the objective function and 
constraints, appropriate strategies are selected. In both scenarios, once mitigation strategies have been 
evaluated (risk treatment), it becomes more important to re-assess the risks after implementation of 
strategies as the strength of interdependency between risks is reduced and the new network yields 
relatively independent risks. Therefore, an appropriate risk measure is used to prioritise critical risks for 
the monitoring stage and developing contingency plans.  
5.2 Optimisation of a Portfolio of Risk Mitigation Strategies 
We also investigate an important aspect of selecting optimal risk mitigation strategies within a network 
of interacting risk sources, risks and mitigation strategies subject to resource and budget constraints. 
Although we just make use of ܴܰܧܮ within the objective function that reflects the risk attitude of a risk-
neutral decision-maker, the function can be tailored for capturing other risk attitudes with the addition 
of constraints like mitigating critical risks identified through the proposed risk measures. The following 
two problems relate to different constraints: the first considers optimising a portfolio of strategies 
subject to resource constraint; whereas the second relates to the optimisation problem subject to a 
budget constraint. 
Problem No. 1 
Given different options of implementing preventive and reactive strategies across a network of 
interconnected risk sources, risks and strategies, what is the optimal combination of these strategies 
yielding maximum (minimum) value of an objective function subject to resource constraint? 
Objective function. In this study, we consider the following objective functions: 
 ܴܰܧܮఊೣೞఊೣೞאఊ೉ೄ௠௜௡  ݏǤ ݐǤ  ? ൏ ݊ ൑ ܰ (5) 
 ܴܰܧܮௌ஼ െ ܴܰܧܮఊೣೞ െ ܥఊೣೞఊೣೞאఊ೉ೄ௠௔௫  ݏǤ ݐǤ  ? ൏ ݊ ൑ ܰ (6) 
where ܰ is the total number of potential mitigation strategies, ܴܰܧܮௌ஼is the risk network expected loss under standard configuration of risk network (with no 
potential strategy implemented), ߛ௑ೄ is a set of all possible orderings of different states of ܰ mitigation strategies, ܥఊೣೞ  is the cost of implementing ߛ௫ೞ  combination of mitigation strategies, ݊ is the number of strategies being considered for implementation. 
Problem No. 2 
Given different options of implementing preventive and reactive strategies across a network of 
interconnected risk sources, risks and mitigation strategies, what is the optimal combination of these 
strategies yielding minimum value of an objective function subject to budget constraint? 
Objective function. In this problem setting, we consider the following objective function: 
 ܴܰܧܮఊೣೞఊೣೞאఊ೉ೄ௠௜௡  ݏǤ ݐǤ  ? ൏ ܥఊೣೞ ൑ ܿ ? (7) 
where ܿ଴ is the budget constraint. 
Few studies have considered addressing a similar problem. Micheli et al. (2014) used the stochastic 
integer linear programming approach to select optimal strategies considering fuzzy-extended pairwise 
comparisons for the categories of risk impact. Aqlan and Lam (2015) used the Bow-Tie technique to 
identify and evaluate critical risks, and solved the multi-objective mixed-integer linear optimisation 
problem (objectives: total risk reduction, mitigation cost) using the goal programming. We consider a 
more complicated version of the problem where the ܴܰܧܮఊೣೞ value is calculated through running the 
BBN model for each combination of strategies. However, modelling the problem within the framework 
of BBNs makes it easier for the decision maker to only provide the effectiveness of each strategy in 
terms of reducing the probability and/or impact of related risk(s). Otherwise, it would be a daunting task 
to elicit these values from the decision maker in case of following the methods proposed by Aqlan and 
Lam (2015) and Micheli et al. (2014).  
6. Demonstration of the Proposed Method 
6.1 Description of the Case Study  
We demonstrate the application of our proposed method through a simulation study. The study is based 
on the case study (Tuncel & Alpan, 2010) that was conducted in a medium-sized Turkish company 
involved in producing supplementary parts for electric, automotive and home appliance industries. Risk 
management is performed from the perspective of the manufacturer and only the immediate supply 
chain partners of the manufacturer are considered in the case study. Scope of the risk management is 
confined to the four sub-systems of the supply chain: the inbound/outbound logistics; the operations at 
the manufacturer; the operations at the suppliers; and the final customers (via the retailer).  
We make use of the same risks, associated risk sources and mitigation strategies in our simulation study 
that were identified in the case study through the FMEA. Mainly the existing causal dependency 
between individual risks and corresponding risk sources and strategies as reflected in the case study is 
maintained in our simulation study. However, in order to demonstrate the interdependency between 
different risk sources, risks and mitigation strategies, we have established arbitrary connections across 
seemingly possible causal factors. We used GeNIe (GeNIe, 2015) for modelling the network of risks and 
mitigation strategies. The qualitative structure of our model is shown in Fig. 7 whereas all the 
parameters used in the model are given in the Supplementary Material (see Appendix C). The oval 
shaped nodes indicate the uncertain variables representing both the risks and risk sources. Rectangular 
nodes represent different potential mitigation strategies and diamond shaped nodes represent the 
losses corresponding to different risks. It is important to realise that some mitigation strategies are 
directly connected to the risk sources or risks representing preventive strategies that reduce the 
probability of associated events. Risk mitigation strategies directly connected to the diamond shaped 
nodes represent reactive strategies that mitigate the impact of loss once the risk is realised.  
 
Fig. 7. Supply chain risks, risk sources and mitigation strategies modelled as a Bayesian Belief Network 
(GeNIe, 2015) 
We have not used the ordinal data for the occurrence and severity for two reasons. Firstly, the 
occurrence data used in the FMEA does not consider the probabilistic interaction of risks and risk 
sources. Secondly, the use of ordinal data and subsequent multiplication of Occurrence, Severity and 
Detectability values for calculation of the RPN are mainly criticised in the literature for associated 
shortcomings (Gilchrist, 1993; Nepal & Yadav, 2015). Therefore, we have assigned assumed probability 
values to all the uncertain nodes using the framework of BBNs. Although we have used the same values 
of severity appearing in the case study, we assume that these are the perceived loss values in the event 
of occurrence of relevant risks. Assumed costs associated with different mitigation strategies are shown 
in Table 6. 
6.2 Results and Analysis 
We focussed on two different scenarios. In the first scenario, we assumed that the strategies shown in 
Fig. 7 have not been already identified and the decision maker is interested in assessing risks first 
followed by mitigation of critical risks. Therefore, considering the decision maker as risk-neutral, we 
used the ܴܰܧܮܲܯ to identify critical risks and subsequently used Shapley value to determine fair 
allocation of budget to mitigate the critical risks identified. In the second scenario, we considered the 
decision problem of optimising the strategies shown in Fig. 7 subject to different constraints. Here we 
assumed that the cost of strategies is already known and the strategies are fairly priced. 
6.2.1  Scenario 1 
We calculated the ܴܰܧܮܲܯ values corresponding to all risks through propagating the impact of each 
risk across the risk network. In contrast with the conventional norm of mapping (independent) risks on a 
two-dimensional plane of probability and impact, we propose assessing the network wide exposure of 
each risk over the risk spectrum as shown in Fig. 8. The size of each bubble represents the product of 
probability and conditional expected loss related to each risk indicating its relative importance and rank. 
R7, R8 and R9 appear to be the most critical risks. Although R2 can pose a major threat to the network in 
case of its activation, its low probability does not necessitate mitigating the risk rather contingency plans 
may be tailored to deal with the risk. 
 
Fig. 8. Risk spectrum representing ranking of interdependent risks for the risk analysis stage with size of 
each bubble reflecting the relative value of RNELPM 
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Let us assume that the decision maker decides to mitigate the three critical risks identified. We 
determined the fair allocation of resources to deal with these risks using the Shapley value. The 
calculations are shown in Table 5. It can be seen that nearly equal budget should be allocated to the 
risks. However, it is important to realise that the allocation is a starting point as it might be possible to 
mitigate R7 at relatively lower cost. If these three risks are related to different suppliers, Shapley value 
helps in rewarding the suppliers fairly. 
Table 5. Relative benefit of controlling each risk toward reduction in risk network expected loss  
Control Risks ܼ ׫ ሼ݅ሽ Expected Loss Benefit of Control Marginal Contribution ሾݒሺܼ ׫ ሼ݅ሽሻ െ ݒሺܼሻሿ Weight ȁܼȁǨ ሺȁܰȁ െ ȁܼȁ െ  ?ሻǨȁܰȁǨ  ݅ ൌ ܴ ? ݅ ൌ ܴ ? ݅ ൌ ܴ ? 
0 24.59 0      ? 20.22 4.37 4.37   1/3  ? 20.33 4.26  4.26  1/3  ? 21.19 3.4   3.4 1/3  ?ǡ  ? 17.21 7.38 3.12 3.01  1/6  ?ǡ  ? 16.82 7.77 4.37  3.4 1/6  ?ǡ  ? 16.92 7.67  4.27 3.41 1/6  ?ǡ  ?ǡ  ? 13.80 10.79 3.12 3.02 3.41 1/3 ݄ܵܽ݌݈݁ݕݒ݈ܽݑ݁ߔ௜ 3.75 3.64 3.4  ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁݅݉݌݋ݎݐܽ݊ܿ݁ (%) 34.76 33.73 31.51  
Once the critical risks are mitigated, there is a need for re-assessing the risks. Therefore, we re-
calculated the ܴܰܧܮܲܯ values for prioritising risks and developing contingency plans. In order to 
compare the values corresponding to the risk assessment and risk monitoring stages, we used the 
normalised ܴܰܧܮܲܯ (with respect to ܴܰܧܮௌ஼) as shown in Fig. 9. As R7, R8 and R9 have been 
completely mitigated, the normalised ܴܰܧܮܲܯ value is shown as 0. R3, R6 and R10 need to be 
monitored owing to the higher measure values. The graph also helps in understanding the benefit of 
mitigating risks toward the risk network. 
 
Fig. 9. Comparison of normalised RNELPM values corresponding to the risk analysis and risk monitoring 
stages 
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6.2.2 Scenario 2 
Once the model was populated with all the parameters, it was updated in order to obtain an array of 
values (ܴܰܧܮ) corresponding to different combinations of mitigation strategies. We considered 
addressing two different problems of selecting optimal mitigation strategies under resource (number of 
strategies) and budget constraints (see section 5.2). 
6.2.2.1 Prioritising Risk Mitigation Strategies under Resource Constraint 
It is extremely important for the decision maker to select optimal cost-effective mitigation strategies 
under resource constraint as it might not be possible for the organisation to implement and manage all 
the strategies simultaneously. We consider the problem of selecting optimal strategies in relation to 
different objective functions (refer to Eqns (5) and (6)) and resource constraint (i.e. limited number of 
strategies can be applied). We updated the model in GeNIe (GeNIe, 2015) and exported the array of 
values to the Microsoft Excel worksheet in order to conduct the analysis. The results of optimal 
combination of strategies corresponding to the two objective functions are shown in Table 6. A decision 
maker might be faced with the problem of ranking mitigation strategies as in addition to the initial cost 
of implementing strategies, effort involved in managing the smooth execution of these strategies might 
be an important factor. The first scheme considers only the risk network expected loss without 
incorporating the cost element whereas the second scheme includes both the factors of improvement in 
risk network expected loss and associated cost of strategies.  
Table 6. Prioritisation of optimal risk mitigation strategies corresponding to different objective functions 
and resource constraint 
No. of Strategies 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
No. of Combinations 1 10 45 120 210 252 210 120 45 10 1 
Optimal Strategies 
based on Minimum 
Risk Network 
Expected Loss 
 S10 
S7, 
S10 
S4, S7, 
S10 
S4, S5, 
S7, 
S10 
S4, S5, 
S7, S9, 
S10 
All 
except 
S1, S2, 
S3 and 
S6 
All 
except 
S1, S2 
and S6 
All 
except 
S2 and 
S6 
All 
except 
S2 
All 
Risk Network 
Expected Loss 
24.6 22.5 21.2 19.6 18.2 17.1 16.1 15.3 14.5 13.8 13.4 
Improvement in Risk 
Network Expected 
Loss less Cost 
 0.1 0.4 1 1.4 1.4 0.5 -0.7 -1.9 -3.2 -3.8 
Mitigation Cost 0 2 3 4 5 6 8 10 12 14 15 
Optimal Strategies 
based on Maximum 
Improvement in Risk 
Network Expected 
Loss less Cost 
 S7 S4, S7 
S4, S5, 
S7 
S4, S5, 
S7, S9 
S4, S5, 
S7, S9, 
S10 
All 
except 
S1, S3, 
S6 and 
S8 
All 
except 
S1, S3 
and S6 
All 
except 
S1 and 
S6 
All 
except 
S6 
All 
Risk Network 
Expected Loss 
24.6 23.3 21.6 20.3 19.2 17.1 16.7 15.7 14.9 14.1 13.4 
Improvement in Risk 
Network Expected 
Loss less Cost 
 0.3 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.4 0.9 -0.1 -1.3 -2.5 -3.8 
Mitigation Cost 0 1 2 3 4 6 7 9 11 13 15 
 
Different combinations of mitigation strategies corresponding to the two objective functions and 
number of strategies are shown in Fig. 10 and Fig. 11. In both the graphs, it can be observed that there 
are a number of possible solutions to implementing specific number of strategies except the two 
options of implementing  ‘no strategy ? and  ‘all strategies ?. All combinations of strategies except the 
optimal combinations as mentioned in Table 6 are not optimal for managing risks. 
 
Fig. 10. Variation of risk network expected loss with the number of strategies 
 
Fig. 11. Variation of improvement in risk network expected loss less cost with the number of strategies  
 
6.2.2.2 Prioritising Risk Mitigation Strategies under Budget Constraint 
In this problem setting, we consider the choice of selecting optimal strategies keeping in view the 
budget constraint. It can also be interpreted as a problem of selecting a cost-effective combination of 
mitigation strategies corresponding to a specific level of risk exposure (risk network expected loss). The 
results are shown in Table 7 which reveal the difference in selected combinations corresponding to the 
budget constraint. All combinations of strategies including the optimal solutions related to the objective 
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function are shown in Fig. 12. The optimal solutions for the objective function against specific budget 
constraint are represented by the corresponding lowest points. The graph indicates that the rate of 
improvement decreases with the increase in mitigation cost. Improvement in the risk network expected 
loss considering the cost of implementing strategies is shown in Fig. 13. Maximum net benefit 
(improvement in risk network expected loss less cost) is achieved at a cost of 6 units.  
Table 7. Prioritisation of optimal risk mitigation strategies corresponding to the objective function with 
budget constraint 
Mitigation 
Cost 
Minimum Risk Network Expected Loss 
Strategies 
Risk Network 
Expected Loss 
0 - 24.6 
1 S7 23.3 
2 S4, S7 21.6 
3 S4, S5, S7 20.3 
4 S4, S5, S7, S9 19.2 
5 S4, S5, S7, S10 18.2 
6 S4, S5, S7, S9, S10 17.1 
7 All except S1, S3, S6 and S8 16.7 
8 All except S1, S2, S3 and S6 16.1 
9 All except S1, S3 and S6 15.7 
10 All except S1, S2 and S6 15.3 
11 All except S1 and S6 14.9 
12 All except S2 and S6 14.5 
13 All except S6 14.1 
14 All except S2 13.8 
15 All 13.4 
 
 
Fig. 12. Variation of risk network expected loss with the cost of strategies 
Let us assume that the decision maker has implemented all potential strategies. In order to prioritise 
risks for the risk monitoring stage, we evaluated the ܴܰܧܮܲܯ values for the risks as shown in Fig. 14. If 
we compare the results with the prioritisation results shown in Fig. 8, the conditional expected loss and 
the marginal probability values for all the risks are reduced substantially. R6 is the most significant risk 
for developing a contingency plan. Evaluation of risk mitigation strategies through our proposed 
approach helps in identifying an optimal mix of preventive and reactive strategies. As our approach 
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Cost of Mitigation Strategies 
incorporates interdependency between supply chain risks, risk sources and mitigation strategies and 
follows a rigorous approach grounded in the theoretical framework of BBNs, the resulting solution can 
be considered as viable. However, it is assumed that the network structure and elicited values would 
truly reflect the real-time risk scenario. Adopting standard procedures of expert judgment can reduce 
the associated problems.    
 
Fig. 13. Variation of improvement in risk network expected loss less cost with the cost of strategies 
 
Fig. 14. Risk spectrum representing ranking of interdependent risks for the risk monitoring stage with 
size of each bubble reflecting the relative value of RNELPM 
7. Conclusions  
Current literature in SCRM has not considered the evaluation of risk mitigation strategies within a 
setting of interconnected risks and strategies involving the probabilistic interdependency between risks, 
losses resulting from the realisation of risks, and costs and relative benefits associated with different 
mitigation strategies. Moreover, existing risk measures do not capture the holistic network wide impact 
of risks and there is a need to develop dependency based measures that could be utilised in a specific 
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context. We proposed a SCRM process within the theoretically grounded framework of BBNs in order to 
bridge this major research gap. Modelling of risks through this approach is viable for even a huge 
network comprising many supply chain actors as opposed to the process mapping of a supply chain that 
involves brainstorming of risks following the supply network configuration. Our proposed method can 
help in determining an optimal mix of strategies in relation to budget and resource constraints. 
We introduced dependency based risk measures for ranking risks and evaluating strategies that 
represent the relative contribution of each risk to the loss propagation across the network of 
interconnected risks in the scenario of its activation. Measures based on techniques other than BBNs are 
not able to capture the probabilistic interactions between risks and fail to account for causal and 
diagnostic inferencing. Using the concept of Shapley value, we have also devised a method to determine 
a fair allocation of resources to mitigate risks once the mitigation strategies with associated costs are 
not already established within a network setting.  
There are few limitations of the study: we have only considered binary states for the risks and mitigation 
strategies; we have not modelled the detectability of risks as to how early a risk could be detected 
before its activation; and finally, the risk network captures a particular moment in time whereas the 
dynamic nature of the risk is not exclusively modelled. Future research may focus on representing risks 
by continuous variables and also, a control strategy may be represented by a continuum of control 
levels, associated effectiveness and costs. The proposed process may be applied in real case studies in 
order to evaluate its efficacy and be extended to account for strategic risks where the state of a risk is 
not driven by chance rather players within the supply network behave opportunistically and therefore, 
the actors make a choice based on maximising their expected utility value. Another important aspect is 
to model the detectability of risks as the response time before complete activation of a risk is a critical 
factor. Furthermore, the model can be extended to establish the source of defects within the supply 
chain especially in case of the food sector where it is hard to ascertain the main source of 
contamination. 
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Appendix A: Proofs 
Proof of Observation 1 ܴܰܧܮ ൌ ܧሾܰܮሿ ൌ ܧሾܰܮȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿ൫ ? െ ܲሺܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሻ൯ ൅ ܧሾܰܮȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿܲሺܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሻ  ൌ ܧሾܰܮȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿ ൅ ܲሺܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሻሺܧሾܰܮȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿെܧሾܰܮȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿሻ 
As ܧሾܰܮȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿ ൐ ܧሾܰܮȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿ this is an increasing function in ܲሺܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሻ going from ܧሾܰܮȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿ 
to ܧሾܰܮȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿ. 
Proof of Observation 2 ܧே௅ሾሺܰܮ െ ܧሾܰܮሿǡ  ?ሻሿ ൌ ܧே௅ሾሺܰܮ െ ܧሾܰܮሿǡ  ?ሻȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿܲሺܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሻ ൅ ܧே௅ሾሺܰܮ െܧሾܰܮሿǡ  ?ሻȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿܲሺܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሻ  
From Observation 1 we know when ܴ௜ ൌ  ? then ܧሾܰܮȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿ ൐ ܧሾܰܮሿ as well ܧሾሺܰܮǡ ܧሾܰܮሿሻȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿ ൒ ܧሾܰܮȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿ and therefore ܧே௅ሾሺܰܮ െ ܧሾܰܮሿǡ  ?ሻȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿ ൒ ܧሾܰܮȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿ െ ܧሾܰܮሿ ൌ ሺܧሾܰܮȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿ െ ܧሾܰܮሿǡ  ?ሻ 
From Observation 1 we know when ܴ௜ ൌ  ? then ܧሾܰܮȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿ ൏ ܧሾܰܮሿ and therefore ܧே௅ሾ݉ܽݔሺܰܮ െ ܧሾܰܮሿǡ  ?ሻȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿ ൒  ? ൌ ݉ܽݔሺܧሾܰܮȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿ െ ܧሾܰܮሿǡ  ?ሻ 
Proof of Observation 3 
ோோ௅௉ெ೔ି௎்஼೔௉ሺோ೔ୀଵሻ ൌ ܧሾܰܮȁܴ݅ൌ ?ሿܲሺܴ݅ൌ ?ሻെሺܧሾܰܮȁܴ݅ൌ ?ሿെܧሾܰܮሿሻܲሺܴ݅ൌ ?ሻ௉ሺோ೔ୀଵሻ   ൌ ܧሾܰܮሿ ൌ ܴܰܧܮ 
Proof of Proposition 1 
From the proof of Observation 2 we have the inequality ܧሾ݉ܽݔሺܰܮǡ ܧሾܰܮሿሻȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿ ൒ ܧሾܰܮȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿ 
which is an equality when ܲሺܰ݁ݐݓ݋ݎ݇ܮ݋ݏݏ ൏ ܴܰܧܮȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሻ ൌ  ?.   
Proof of Proposition 2 ܷܶܥ௜ ൌ ܧோ೔ሾ݉ܽݔሺܧሾܰܮȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿ െ ܧሾܰܮሿǡ  ?ሻሿ ൌ ൫ܧሾܰܮȁܴ݅ ൌ  ?ሿ െ ܧሾܰܮȁܴ݅ ൌ  ?ሿܲሺܴ݅ ൌ  ?ሻ െ ܧሾܰܮȁܴ݅ ൌ  ?ሿܲሺܴ݅ ൌ  ?ሻ൯ܲሺܴ݅ ൌ  ?ሻ ൌ ሺܧሾܰܮȁܴ݅ ൌ  ?ሿ െ ܧሾܰܮȁܴ݅ ൌ  ?ሿሻܲሺܴ݅ ൌ  ?ሻܲሺܴ݅ ൌ  ?ሻ ൌ ሺܧሾܰܮȁܴ݅ ൌ  ?ሿܲሺܴ݅ ൌ  ?ሻ െ ܧሾܰܮȁܴ݅ ൌ  ?ሿܲሺܴ݅ ൌ  ?ሻሻܲሺܴ݅ ൌ  ?ሻ 
ൌ ሺܧሾܰܮȁܴ݅ ൌ  ?ሿܲሺܴ݅ ൌ  ?ሻ െ ܧሾܰܮȁܴ݅ ൌ  ?ሿ ൅ ܧሾܰܮȁܴ݅ ൌ  ?ሿܲሺܴ݅ ൌ  ?ሻሻܲሺܴ݅ ൌ  ?ሻ ൌ ሺܧሾܰܮሿ െ ܧሾܰܮȁܴ݅ ൌ  ?ሿሻܲሺܴ݅ ൌ  ?ሻ ൌ ܮܶܩ௜ 
Proof of Proposition 3 ܷܶܥ௜ ൌ ܧோ೔ሾ݉ܽݔሺܧሾܰܮȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿ െ ܧሾܰܮሿǡ  ?ሻሿ ൌ ܲሺܴ݅ ൌ  ?ሻ൫ܧሾܰܮȁܴ݅ ൌ  ?ሿ െ ܧሾܰܮȁܴ݅ ൌ  ?ሿܲሺܴ݅ ൌ  ?ሻ െ ܧሾܰܮȁܴ݅ ൌ  ?ሿܲሺܴ݅ ൌ  ?ሻ൯ ൌ ܲሺܴ݅ ൌ  ?ሻܲሺܴ݅ ൌ  ?ሻሺܧሾܰܮȁܴ݅ ൌ  ?ሿ െ ܧሾܰܮȁܴ݅ ൌ  ?ሿሻ ൌ ߪ ݅?ሾܧሾܰܮȁܴ݅ ൌ  ?ሿ െ ܧሾܰܮȁܴ݅ ൌ  ?ሿሿ 
Proof of Corollary 1 
As ܷܶܥ௜ ൌ ߪ௜ଶሾܧሾܰܮȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿ െ ܧሾܰܮȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿሿ ൌ ܲሺܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሻܲሺܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሻሺܧሾܰܮȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿ െ ܧሾܰܮȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿሻ this can 
be reduced to 0 either by setting ܲሺܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሻ ൌ  ? or ܲሺܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሻ ൌ  ?. If we assume that costs increase with 
reducing ܲሺܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሻ then the optimal target for each risk would be ܲሺܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሻ ൌ  ?. 
Proof of Proposition 4 
The optimisation problem is ݉݅݊  ? ܴܰܧܮܲܯ݅݅  s.t.   ? ܥ௜ሺܲ݅ሻ ൌ݅ ܿ଴ 
The Lagrangian function for this constrained optimisation problem is  ܱ ൌ ෍ ܲ݅ܧሾܮȁܴ݅ ൌ  ?ሿ݅ ൅ ߣሺ෍ ܥ௜ሺܲ݅ሻ െ݅ ܿ଴ሻ 
And the first-order conditions (FOC) are  ௜ܱ ൌ ܧሾܮȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿ ൅ ߣܥԢ݅ሺ ௜ܲሻ ൌ  ?׊݅ 
and ܱߣ ൌ ෍ ܥ௜ሺܲ݅ሻ െ݅ ܿ଴ ൌ  ? 
This gives us  
 ?Ȁߣ ۏێێێ
ۍܧሾܮȁܴ ? ൌ  ?ሿǤǤǤܧሾܮȁܴ݊ ൌ  ?ሿےۑۑ
ۑې ൌ ۏێێێ
ۍെܥଵᇱሺܲ ?ሻǤǤǤെܥ௡ᇱ ሺܲ݊ሻےۑۑ
ۑې
 s.t.   ? ܥ௜ሺܲ݅ሻ ൌ݅ ܿ଴ 
 
 
 
Proof of Lemma 1 
From FOC we have 
ଵߣכ ۏێێێ
ۍܧሾܮȁܴ ? ൌ  ?ሿǤǤǤܧሾܮȁܴ݊ ൌ  ?ሿےۑۑ
ۑې ൌ ۏێێێ
ۍെܥଵᇱሺܲ ?ሻǤǤǤെܥ௡ᇱ ሺܲ݊ሻےۑۑ
ۑې
 s.t.   ? ܥ௜ሺܲ݅ሻ ൌ݅ ܿ଴ 
The unconstrained optimal solution has ߣכ ൌ  ?. Assuming ݏ݅݃݊൫ܥ௜ᇱᇱሺ ௜ܲሻ൯ ൌ ݏ݅݃݊ ቀܥ௝ᇱᇱ൫ ௝ܲ൯ቁ׊݅ǡ ݆ 
decreasing ߣכ will result in higher costs (i.e. a lower ௜ܲ) only if ݏ݅݃݊൫ܥ௜ᇱᇱሺ ௜ܲሻ൯ ൐  ? and increasing ߣכ will 
result in higher costs only if ݏ݅݃݊൫ܥ௜ᇱᇱሺ ௜ܲሻ൯ ൏  ?.      
Proof of Proposition 5 
We now seek to understand how the optimal risk mitigation strategy changes with a relaxation in the 
budget. Writing ௜ܲכሺܿ଴ሻ for the optimal solution for each ݅, which is implicitly defined by the relationship െܥ௜ᇱሺ ௜ܲכሺܿ଴ሻሻ ൌ ቀ ଵఒכቁ ܧሾܮȁܴ௜ ൌ  ?ሿ, we differentiate each of the first-order conditions with respect to ܿ଴ 
to deduce 
ߣܥ௜ᇱᇱ ݀ܲ݅כሺܿ ?ሻ݀ܿ ? ൅ ܥ௜ᇱ ݀ߣ݀ܿ ? ൌ  ?׊݅ ܥ௜ᇱ ݀ܲ݅כሺܿ ?ሻ݀ܿ ? ൅ ෍ ܥ௝ᇱ ݆݀ܲכሺܿ ?ሻ݀ܿ ? െ  ?௝ஷ௜ ൌ  ? 
The ݅th equation in the first set gives ݀ߣ݀ܿ଴ ൌ െߣ ܥԢ݅ԢܥԢ݅ ݀ ௜ܲכሺܿ଴ሻ݀ܿ଴  
Each of the other equations in the first set gives for each ݆ ് ݅ ݀ ௝ܲכሺܿ଴ሻ݀ܿ଴ ൌ െ ݀ߣ݀ܿ଴  ?ߣ ܥԢ݆ܥԢ݆Ԣ 
ൌ ܥԢ݅ԢܥԢ݅ ݀ ௜ܲכሺܿ଴ሻ݀ܿ଴ ܥԢ݆ܥԢ݆Ԣ 
(using 
ௗߣௗ௖బ just deduced). Inserting these objects into the final equation gives 
ܥ௜ᇱ ݀ܲ݅כሺܿ ?ሻ݀ܿ ? ൅ ܥ௜ᇱᇱܥ௜ᇱ ݀ܲ݅כሺܿ ?ሻ݀ܿ ? ෍ ܥ௝ᇱଶܥ௝ᇱᇱ௝ஷ௜ ൌ  ? ݀ ௜ܲכሺܿ଴ሻ݀ܿ଴ ൌ  ?ܥ௜ᇱ ൅ ܥ௜ᇱᇱܥ௜ᇱ  ? ܥԢ݆  ?ܥ௝ᇱᇱ௝ஷ௜  
ൌ  ?ܥ௜ᇱ ൅  ? ܥ௝ᇱ ܣ݅ܣ݆௝ஷ௜  ൌ  ?ܥ௜ᇱ ܣ݅ܣ݅ ൅  ? ܥ௝ᇱ ܣ݅ܣ݆௝ஷ௜  ൌ  ? ? ܥ௞ᇱ ܣ݅ܣ݇௡௞ୀଵ  
where ܣ௜ ൌ ܥԢ݅ԢܥԢ݅  is the Arrow Pratt measure of risk aversion applied to the cost function that measures its 
curvature, and ݊ is the total number of risks within the network. 
This allows us to understand how the probability of a particular risk would change through mitigation if 
extra budget became available. When seeking to allocate additional resource to mitigating risk a 
decision maker will be seeking to reduce probabilities in the most effective way, and this depends on 
the curvature of the cost function: a given additional resource to a risk will reduce the probability of it 
occurring more if the cost function is less convex. As such, when the ratio ܥ௜ᇱᇱȀܥ௜ᇱ is small in absolute 
terms for a risk, 
ௗ௉೔כሺ௖బሻௗ௖బ  will be larger in absolute terms (i.e. ௜ܲכሺܿ଴ሻ is steeper) meaning the risk will be 
mitigated more when additional resource is available. 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B: Flow Charts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. B.1. Flow chart for implementing the process where the strategies and associated cost are not already established 
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Fig. B.2. Flow chart for implementing the process where the strategies and associated cost are already established
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at time ܶ ൌ ݐ଴ and commencement of the 
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Appendix C: Model Parameters 
Table C.1. Description of risk sources, risks and mitigation strategies [adapted from Tuncel and Alpan 
(2010)] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Symbol Risk Source (C)/Risk (R) [associated supply chain domain]/Strategy (S) 
C1 Stress on crew 
C2 Long working times 
C3 Lack of training 
C4 Negligence in maintenance 
C5 Old technology 
C6 High competition 
C7 Opportunistic behaviour  
C8 Decline in Customer Resource Management function 
C9 Instable manufacturing process 
C10 Low technical reliability  
C11 Insufficient maintenance 
C12 Dissatisfaction with work 
C13 Strikes 
C14 Lack of training 
C15 Poor working conditions 
C16 Insufficient breaks 
C17 Planning and scheduling errors 
C18 Bullwhip effect 
C19 Low technical reliability 
C20 Technological changes 
C21 Contractual problems 
C22 Monopoly 
R1 Human error [Inbound/Outbound Logistics] 
R2 Natural hazards [Inbound/Outbound Logistics] 
R3 Technical problems with transportation vehicles [Inbound/Outbound Logistics] 
R4 Loss of market share [Customers] 
R5 Fluctuations in customer demands [Customers] 
R6 Technical problems [Manufacturer] 
R7 Absence of operator [Manufacturer] 
R8 Human error [Manufacturer] 
R9 Scarcity of raw parts [Suppliers] 
R10 Poor quality in purchased products from supplier [Suppliers] 
R11 Loosing competitive advantage of supplier [Suppliers] 
R12 Decline in business relations with supplier [Suppliers] 
S1 Insurance 
S2 Capital investment 
S3 R&D and marketing strategies 
S4 Reward system 
S5 Good relations with labour union 
S6 Training 
S7 Ergonomic Awareness program  
S8 Investment in Enterprise Resource Planning 
S9 Information sharing with supplier 
S10 Rigorous process of Supplier selection 
Table C.2. Probability values of root nodes 
Causes or Risks ( ௜ܺሻ ܲሺ ௜ܺ ൌ ܶݎݑ݁ሻ 
C2 0.2 
C3 0.1 
R2 0.1 
C4 0.3 
C6 0.05 
C7 0.1 
C8 0.2 
C9 0.3 
C10 0.4 
C11 0.2 
C16 0.1 
C20 0.1 
C21 0.3 
C22 0.1 
 
Table C.3. Conditional probability values of child nodes ܲܽݎ݁݊ݐݏ ܲሺ ௜ܺ ൌ ܶݎݑ݁ȁܲܽݎ݁݊ݐݏሻ 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 S2 S3 C1 C5 R1 R3 R4 R5 
 T         0.7      
 F         0.3      
T T T          0.9    
T T F          0.5    
T F T          0.7    
T F F          0.3    
F F T          0.6    
F T F          0.3    
F T T          0.7    
F F F          0.01    
        Y   0.1     
        N   0.4     
   T T         0.9   
   T F         0.7   
   F T         0.4   
   F F         0.1   
     T T   Y     0.4  
     T F   Y     0.3  
     F T   Y     0.3  
     F F   Y     0.02  
     T T   N     0.98  
     T F   N     0.5  
     F T   N     0.7  
     F F   N     0.1  
       T        0.4 
       F        0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C.3. Conditional probability values of child nodes (continued) ܲܽݎ݁݊ݐݏ ܲሺ ௜ܺ ൌ ܶݎݑ݁ȁܲܽݎ݁݊ݐݏሻ 
C9 C10 C11 C12 C13 C14 C15 C16 S4 S5 S6 S7 R6 C12 C13 C14 C15 R7 R8 
T T T          0.99       
T F T          0.8       
T T F          0.8       
T F F          0.6       
F T F          0.6       
F F T          0.5       
F T T          0.8       
F F F          0.01       
      T  Y     0.7      
      F  Y     0.02      
      T  N     0.8      
      F  N     0.4      
         Y     0.2     
         N     0.6     
          Y     0.2    
          N     0.5    
           Y     0.1   
           N     0.6   
   T T             0.99  
   T F             0.6  
   F T             0.8  
   F F             0.1  
   T  T T T           0.99 
   T  T T F           0.9 
   T  T F T           0.9 
   T  T F F           0.8 
   T  F T T           0.8 
   T  F T F           0.75 
   T  F F T           0.7 
   T  F F F           0.65 
   F  T T T           0.7 
   F  T T F           0.6 
   F  T F T           0.5 
   F  T F F           0.4 
   F  F T T           0.5 
   F  F T F           0.4 
   F  F F T           0.2 
   F  F F F           0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C.3. Conditional probability values of child nodes (continued) ܲܽݎ݁݊ݐݏ ܲሺ ௜ܺ ൌ ܶݎݑ݁ȁܲܽݎ݁݊ݐݏሻ 
C9 C10 C11 C12 C13 C14 C15 C16 S4 S5 S6 S7 R6 C12 C13 C14 C15 R7 R8 
T T T          0.99       
T F T          0.8       
T T F          0.8       
T F F          0.6       
F T F          0.6       
F F T          0.5       
F T T          0.8       
F F F          0.01       
      T  Y     0.7      
      F  Y     0.02      
      T  N     0.8      
      F  N     0.4      
         Y     0.2     
         N     0.6     
          Y     0.2    
          N     0.5    
           Y     0.1   
           N     0.6   
   T T             0.99  
   T F             0.6  
   F T             0.8  
   F F             0.1  
   T  T T T           0.99 
   T  T T F           0.9 
   T  T F T           0.9 
   T  T F F           0.8 
   T  F T T           0.8 
   T  F T F           0.75 
   T  F F T           0.7 
   T  F F F           0.65 
   F  T T T           0.7 
   F  T T F           0.6 
   F  T F T           0.5 
   F  T F F           0.4 
   F  F T T           0.5 
   F  F T F           0.4 
   F  F F T           0.2 
   F  F F F           0.01 
 
 
Table C.4. Loss values of risks [adapted from Tuncel and Alpan (2010)] 
Symbol Risk Loss 
R1 Human error  4 
R2 Natural hazards  8 
R3 Technical problems with transportation vehicles  5 
R4 Loss of market share  7 
R5 Fluctuations in customer demands  6 
R6 Technical problems  7 
R7 Absence of operator  5 
R8 Human error  6 
R9 Scarcity of raw parts  6 
R10 Poor quality in purchased products from supplier  8 
R11 Loosing competitive advantage of supplier  6 
R12 Decline in business relations with supplier  5 
 
 
 
Table C.5. Costs associated with mitigation strategies 
Symbol Mitigation Strategy Cost 
S1 Insurance 2 
S2 Capital investment 1 
S3 R&D and marketing strategies 2 
S4 Reward system 1 
S5 Good relations with labour union 1 
S6 Training 2 
S7 Ergonomic Awareness program  1 
S8 Investment in Enterprise Resource Planning 2 
S9 Information sharing with supplier 1 
S10 Rigorous process of Supplier selection 2 
 
References 
Tuncel, G., & Alpan, G. (2010). Risk assessment and management for supply chain networks: A case 
study. Computers in Industry, 61(3), 250-259. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.compind.2009.09.008 
 
